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WELUIVGTON LIBRARY 
ABSTRACT 
Republicans in Australia and New Zealand argue that as independent 
nation states, it is no longer appropriate that our head of state is the Queen of the 
United Kingdom, even if she is known as the Queen of Australia and the Queen 
of New Zealand respectively. The final step in each country becoming a republic 
would be to replace the sovereign as head of state with a republican president. 
The sovereign, represented in Australia and in New Zealand by a Governor-
General, has statutory, prerogative and discretionary reserve powers, the exercise 
of which is governed by constitutional conventions. If the sovereign is to be 
replaced by a republican President, perhaps directly elected by the people, what 
sort of powers should the President have? 
This paper consider ways Australia and ew Zealand could limit the 
powers of a directly elected President to preserve the constitutional balance and 
ensure the President could not exercise executive power independently of the 
government. Part I examines the shared constitutional evolution of Australia and 
New Zealand from colonies to Dominions to politically independent nations, and 
concludes that the shared nature of that evolution makes it worthwhile to 
compare republican options. Part II recognises some significant constitutional 
differences between Australia and New Zealand that might affect how each could 
become a republic, but suggests that these do not necessarily affect a President's 
powers. Part III analyses the symbolic, ceremonial and constitutional roles of 
our current Governors-General and finds significant similarity in those roles, 
notably in relation to the Governor-General's reserve powers. Part IV assesses a 
range of options to constrain the republican president' s discretionary powers so 
as to retain the refined constitutional balance of our parliamentary democracies. 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 15,373 words. 
Writing in 1966, the late Donald Horne, left wing intellectual and ardent 
republican complained: 1 
But the Queen is in London and here we are in Australia. She is not really 
our Queen. She does not stand for us. She stands as a symbol of how 
derivative we are, how provincial and second-rate. 
Although written nearly forty years ago, this comment neatly encapsulates the 
arguments for change propounded by republicans in Australia and New Zealand 
- our head of state is foreign and distant both physically and culturally, and 
having a distant monarch as head of state shows a lack of national pride and 
independence. 
Australia and New Zealand were colonies of imperial Britain, and have 
inherited from Britain important elements of their constitutional frameworks. 
Australia, as a federation of states, also drew heavily from the .American 
expenence. Although there are some important differences, such as ew 
Zealand having a unicameral Parliament. Australia and New Zealand share many 
aspects of their constitutional arrangements. For both countries, the key 
constitutional actors are the parliament and sovereign, the executive and the 
judiciary. Both Australia and New Zealand have a refined constitutional 
framework, based on the principle of responsible government, which attempts to 
explain the relationship between each of these constitutional actors and to 
balance their powers. The twentieth century saw for each a whittling away of 
direct British influence and its replacement with independent government. still 
strongly rooted in the Westminster tradition. 
The process of independence from Britain has. to a great extent, already 
been achieved through imperial political declaration, political action and 
legislative change. For Australia and New Zealand finally to sever constitutional 
ties with Britain and become republics would require removing the monarch. 
currently Queen Elizabeth II. as our head of state. But removing one key 
1 Donald Home ··Republican Australia"' in Geoffrey Dutton (ed) Australia and the Monarchy 
(Sun Books. Melbourne. 1966) 88 
constitutional actor - the sovereign - raises the question of what should replace 
it. If the monarch is to be replaced by a republican head of state, let us call it a 
President, what should be the relationship of the President to the other elements 
of government and, more significantly, what powers should a President have? 
Should a President retain the same statutory powers, the exercise of the royal 
prerogative and the same discretionary power to act, in limited circumstances, 
without ministerial advice (the 'reserve powers')? 
In Australia, the very fact of the controversial dismissal by Governor-
General Sir John Kerr of the Rt Hon Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister in 1975 
begs the question of what sort of powers a President might have, and shapes the 
constitutional debate, at least among constitutional experts. In New Zealand, 
debate about what to do with the powers of the Governor-General if New 
Zealand were to become a republic has been more muted. This might be because 
there has been no instance in recent New Zealand history to suggest the 
Governor-General would exercise his or her powers without Ministerial advice. 
However, Palmer and Palmer have articulated the need for consideration in New 
Zealand of what powers should be given to a President, saying "[ w ]e should not 
simply replace the Queen with a President. The legal powers of that person 
would be awesome and unacceptable unless an exercise were done to define and 
confine the powers".2 A move to a republic would require careful consideration 
of the powers to be granted to the President in order to ensure the constitutional 
balance is not skewed and that constitutional safeguards, often based on 
convention, are retained. 
Consideration of how a President might be chosen, whether he or she 
should have secure tenure or, if not, how he or she should be able to be removed 
from office, are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the nature of the 
office will affect the sort of powers the holder of the office should exercise. If a 
President were to be appointed, then he or she should have no more personal 
discretion beyond that necessary to ensure the effective operation of 
parliamentary democracy. As Professor Bailey has pointed out. the only 
,, 
- Sir Geoffrey Palmer & Matthew Palmer Bridled Power - New Zealand's Constitution and 
Government (4 th
 ed, Oxford University Press. Melbourne, 2004) 65 
5 
acceptable reserve powers for an appointed president would be those that are "the 
corollary of the democratic principle that political authority is derived from the 
people". 3 
If, as the Australian electorate appears to demand4, a President were to be 
directly elected, then he or she could claim a mandate from the entire electorate. 5 
There is a risk of creating a democratic power base to rival Parliament. The 
greater the office holder's personal democratic mandate, the greater would be the 
possibility of the independent exercise of his or her discretionary powers. In 
such circumstances, as ew Zealand commentator Andrew Ladley has argued, 
the nature and extent of executive powers would need to be carefully defined. 6 
Given Australians want to elect their President, this paper takes up 
Professor Winterton's challenge7 to consider ways of limiting the powers of a 
directly elected President to preserve the constitutional balance and ensure the 
President could not exercise executive power independently of the government. 
The New Zealand public has not yet been asked for its opinion on the mode of 
election of a President. But ten years after the last major constitutional change-
the introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional representation system 
(MMP) - it is timely to consider which ideas and solutions proposed in Australia 
might be relevant for New Zealand, and which ideas from New Zealand might 
illuminate options for Australia. 
Part I of this paper examines how Australia and New Zealand have, to a 
great extent, already achieved constitutional independence from the United 
Kingdom. Legislative, executive including prerogative and judicial powers have 
already been transferred to each country. This independence from Britain has 
been achieved through political agreement, imperial declarations and the passage 
3 in George Winterton Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General - ,.J Constitutional 
,../nalysis (Melbourne University Press. Melbourne, 1983) 153 
4 George Winterton ·'A Directly Elected President: Maximising Benefits and Minimising Risks" 
(2001)3 UNADLR29,29 
5 Winterton '·A Directly Elected President" above n4, 34 
6 Andrew Ladley .. Who Should be Head of State·' in Colin James (ed) Building the Consritwion 
( Institute of Policy Studies. Victoria University of Wellington. 2000) '275 
- Winterton ·'A Directly Elected President" above n4, ..i I 
6 
of legislation rather than by bloodshed or revolution. Significant constitutional 
changes such as the complete transfer of the prerogative power to conduct 
external affairs have occurred with no amendment of the constitutional 
instruments. Both Australia and New Zealand have shed the vestiges of Empire 
in amicable ways. The shared nature of our constitutional development 
emphasises the value of taking a comparative approach to addressing the 
republican challenge. 
Part II identifies some key constitutional differences between Australia 
and ew Zealand. which might affect the likelihood and ways in which each 
could become a republic. 
The main step in becoming a republic would be to remove the monarch as 
head of state. The monarch is represented in each of Australia and New Zealand 
by a Governor-General, appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime 
Minister. The monarch is further divisible in Australia, in that she also has a 
constitutional role in each of the states, but this paper will focus solely on her 
role with respect to the Commonwealth of Australia. Part III considers the 
Governor-General's symbolic, ceremonial and constitutional roles and the 
sources and content of the various powers exercisable by the incumbent of the 
office. In Part IV, the paper turns to consider what powers a republican President 
should have. 
This paper concludes that there are some important differences in the 
constitutional arrangements of Australia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, the 
similarities of our constitutional development and of the existing powers of the 
Governor-General mean that ideas formulated in each national context for 
ensuring that the current constitutional balance is maintained if the monarch were 
replaced as head of state, are worth considering in the other country. 
7 
I A SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
Australia and New Zealand have valued their historical and political links 
with Britain . In the 1880s, the Australian and New Zealand colonies might have 
been insistent on their own autonomy but, as McLean writes, they were "far too 
conscious of the economic and political advantages of operating within the 
British system to want to throw it aside·'. 8 In 1906, for example, the High Court 
of Australia held there was no Australian nationality distinguished from a British 
nationality.9 Australians were British citizens and felt British. 
Interestingly, given the current economic integration between Australia 
and New Zealand, these links with Britain were more important than the links 
between Australia and New Zealand. For New Zealand, perhaps still aware of 
having been governed from New South Wales from 1831 to 1840, its link to 
Britain helped avoid the perception of being subsumed by Australia. 
Commenting on Prime Minister Seddon' s decision not to join the Australian 
federation, French observer Andre Siegfried noted that by retaining its 
attachment to Britain. New Zealand could avoid: 10 
Australian suzerainty .. . which would wound the New Zealanders pride to 
its very roots .. . In this way may be explained, quite naturally, the line of 
conduct followed by Mr Seddon 's Government: resistance to Australia by 
drawing closer to England. 
This practice of determined separateness was long standing. During the 
1930s. Australia and New Zealand dealt with each other in relation to defence 
through the Committee of Imperial Defence in London; and during World War 
II, made no attempt at a joint assessment of their shared regional concems.11 
And yet, paradoxically, Australia and New Zealand share an intensely nationalist 
moment in the rhetoric of the birth of nationhood as stemming from involvement 
in the Gallipoli campaign. There is an irony in the fact that Australia's pride in 
8 Denis McLean. The Prick(v Pear - Making Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand 
(University ofOtago Press. Dunedin, 2003) 69 
9 Allorney-General for 1he Commonwealth v Ah Shung ( 1906) 4 CLR 949 per Higgins CJ at 951 10 McLean The Prickly Pear above n8 . 86 
11 McLean The Pricklv Pear above n8. I I 0-1 12 
8 
the iconic tall, lean, taimed a1.1d independent soldier fostered by official war 
historian CEW Bean, was based on a creation by English writer Ellis Ashmead-
Bai·tlett.12 There is a further irony in the fact that both Australia and New 
Zealand celebrate a sense of separateness and independent nationalism drawn 
from the san1e experience. 
Despite the shared nationalist experience of Gallipoli, different episodes 
have affirmed Australian and New Zealand independence from Britain. For 
Australia. Prime Minister Curtin in 1941 rejected British demands to keep troops 
in the Middle East and aimounced that Australia looked to America for its 
security ' 'free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United 
Kingdom''. 13 More recently. there was the public insistence that an Australian 
declare open the Sydney Olympics. For New Zealand, Britain ' s entry into the 
Common Market in 1974 emphasised that Britain's economic focus was no 
longer on the Commonwealth. The bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 
has also been seen as a defining event in the development of a more assertive 
New Zealand identity. 14 These nationalist moments have been accompanied by a 
quieter but ongoing constitutional revolution. Australia and New Zealand share 
what Professor Cheryl Saunders has called the British tradition of an 
"evolutionary approach to constitutional change". 15 This approach has seen the 
gradual. and mostly parallel, acquisition by Australia and New Zealand of 
completely independent legislative, executive and judicial powers. 
A Legislative Powers 
The power of the Australian colonies and New Zealand to independently 
legislate resulted from the passage of legislation by the British parliament. In 
1850, the Australian Colonies Government Act transferred effective power to the 
12 
Richard White Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688-1980 (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
1992) 128-9 
13 
Stuart McIntyre Oxford History a/ Australia Volume -I, 1901-19-12 (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1990) 332 
14 
Noel Cox & Raymond Miller '' Monarchy" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Governmem 
and Politics (3 ed. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 2003) 53 
15 
Cheryl Saunders ·'The Australian Experience : Lessons, Pointers and Pitfalls" in James. above 
n6,281 
9 
Australian colonies, allowing them to set up local legislatures and regulate the 
franchise and qualifications for membership of those legislatures. 16 By the ew 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852. the British parliament established a General 
Assembly in New Zealand and granted it powers to make laws for New Zealand. 
In 1865, the Colonial Laws Validity Act, which applied to New Zealand and the 
Australian colonies, ensured colonial legislation was no longer invalid solely 
because of inconsistency with English law, although the common law rule giving 
supremacy to British statutes continued. 
In the 1890s, a senes of Constitutional Conventions 17 worked out the 
features of a nation state to be formed by the federation of the Australian 
colonies. On 5 July 1900, the British Parliament passed the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Australian Constitution). On 17 September, 
Queen Victoria proclaimed that the Australian Commonwealth would come into 
existence on 1 January 1901. A British statute royally proclaimed, created the 
nation state of Australia. In 1907, New Zealand was proclaimed a Dominion and 
the British government withdrew its last instructions for the mandatory 
reservation of bills. The later passage of the New Zealand Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1947 in the United Kingdom and the New Zealand 
Constitution (Amendment) (Request and Consent) Act 1947 in New Zealand 
allowed New Zealand to amend its constitution by passage of its own legislation. 
For the Australian colonies and for New Zealand, British legislation determined 
the acquisition of legislative power exercisable independently of Britain. 
The next evolutionary steps towards political independence for New 
Zealand and Australia were achieved by declarations of Imperial Conferences. 
The Resolution of the 1917 Imperial Conference recognised the Dominions. 
including Australia and ew Zealand, as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth. The Imperial Conference of 1926 declared the Dominions to be 
"autonomous communities within the British Empire. equal in status, in no way 
16 Geoffrey Sawer The rlustralian Constitution (2nd ed .. Australian Government Publishing 
Service. Canberra. 1998) 2 
17 The capital 'C' distinguishes these meetings about the future of the constitution from the 
constitutional conventions that are practices shaping the operation of constitutional arrangements. 
10 
subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs·'. 18 
The Conference accepted as a conventional rule that all smviving British 
legislative and executive powers directly bearing on Dominion affairs were to be 
b l D 
. . 19 used only as requested y the re evant 01111111011 governments. 
The next major realignment of legislative powers towards Australia and 
New Zealand resulted from the Statute of Westminster Act 1931. The Act had to 
be adopted by legislation in Australia and New Zealand to come into effect in 
those countries. In Australia, the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act was 
passed in 1942. although the preamble noted that it took effect on 3 September 
1939. the ''date of commencement of war between His Majesty the King and 
Germany". New Zealand passed its Statute of Westminster Adoption Act in 
1947, thereby, like Australia, adopting key sections of the British statute. As of 
the date of commencement of each Statute of Westminster Adoption Act, the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 no longer applied, and no law made by the 
Parliament of a Dominion was to be void on the basis that it was repugnant to the 
law of England. The Parliament of a Dominion had full power to make laws 
having extra-territorial operation; no act of the British Parliament made after the 
commencement of the Act was to be extended to a Dominion unless so 
requested; and the Dominion Parliament had powers in relation to the courts of 
admiralty.20 The British Parliament restricted its own powers to legislate for 
New Zealand or Australia. 
In 1986, separate local statutes brought an end to British parliamentary 
supremacy over Australia and New Zealand. The Australian Parliament passed 
the Australia Act 1986, terminating the power of the United Kingdom to legislate 
for Australia and finally establishing the full independence of the Australian 
political and legal system.2 1 The New Zealand Parliament passed the 
Constitution Act 1986, which revoked the application of the Constitution Act 
18 
Article 4, Imperial Declaration 1926 in Sawer, above n 16, 71 
19 Sawer, above n I 6. 71 
20 
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Australia), Statute of Westminster Adoption Act, 
1947 (New Zealand) 
21 
Professor Zines ' commentary to HY Evatt The Royal Prerogative (The Law Book Co, North 
Ryde. 1987) C9 
l 1 
185222 and provided that United Kingdom legislation passed after 1986 would 
not extend to New Zealand as part of its law.23 As Professor Zines has said in 
relation to Australia, but which is equally applicable to New Zealand, the 
development of political independence: 24 
... was achieved merely by construing those constitutions in the light of the 
changing and evolving status of the countries concerned evidenced by 
political action, conference declarations, intra-imperial agreements and 
recognition of the international personality of the Dominions by other 
nations . 
Australian and New Zealand legislative independence was peacefully, although 
perhaps paradoxically, achieved by Imperial pronouncements and the passage of 
British legislation. 
B Executive Powers 
The transfer of executive powers from the United Kingdom to Australia 
and New Zealand mirrorred that of legislative powers. The 1926 Imperial 
Conference declared that British executive powers bearing on Dominion affairs 
were from that time only to be used as requested by the relevant Dominion 
governments. 25 
The royal prerogatives - a bundle of miscellaneous rights and powers of 
. 26 fi d executive government - were similarly trans erre . In Australia, the 
prerogative is exercisable by the executive by virtue of Section 61 of the 
Australian Constitution. Considering leave to appeal from a decision of the High 
22 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s26 
23 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s l 5 
2
~ Professor Zines ' commentary to HY Evatt. above n2 l. C2 
?-
_) Cheryl Saunders & Ewart Smith,../ Paper Prepared for Standing Committee D Identifying the 
Conventions Associated 111ith the Commonwealth Constitution (Australian Constitutional 
Convention, 1980) 5 
26 Philip A Joseph ConstitULional and rldministrmive Law in New Zealand (2 ed. Brookers, 
Wellington. 200 I) 585 
1~ 
Court in 1920, Viscount Haldane said of section 61 :27 
... does it not put the sovereign in the position of having parted, so far as the 
affairs of the Commonwealth are concerned, with every shadow of act of 
intervention in their affairs and handing them over, unlike the case in 
Canada, to the Governor-General? 
In his 1927 analysis of the prerogative powers, HV Evatt confidently 
asserted that "our powers of self-government in this respect are complete".28 
Perhaps this demonstrated something of the confidence of a doctoral student, 
because he was slightly more circumspect as Attorney General, about whether 
the Australian executive could exercise the prerogative power to declare war. In 
1941, Evatt as Attorney General advised King George VI to assign to the 
Governor-General the power to declare war on Japan, Finland, Hungary and 
Romania. The cautious assignment was to ensure the Australian executive had 
the power to declare war. By 1951, the Governor-General was clearly perceived 
to have the authority to declare peace with Germany without any specific 
delegation by the King.29 The High Court conclusively established in Barton v 
Commonwealth, 30 that the prerogatives were part of Australian law. 
In his analysis, Evatt considered the case of New Zealand and concluded 
that. as in Australia, there was no legal obstacle in the way of the government 
exercising the full prerogative of the king. 31 In New Zealand, Clause III of 
Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand SIR 
1983/225 (Letters Patent) delegated to the Governor-General the exercise of 
executive, including prerogative, powers.32 The transfer of the prerogative 
power then, was determined by political practice, legal commentary and judicial 
pronouncement in both Australia and New Zealand. 
27 Evatt, above n2 l. 190 
28 Evatt, above 1121, 191 
29 Professor Zines' commentary to HV Evatt. above 1121 , C6 
30 
Barton v Commonwealth ( 1974) 13 I CLR 4 77 See also Victoria v Commonwealth ( l 975) 134 
CLR 338. NSW v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged lands Case) ( 1975) 135 CLR 337 
31 Evatt. above 1121. 195 
32 
Andrew Stockley ·'Becoming a Republic: Issues of Law" in Luke Trainor (ed) Republicanism 
in New Zealand (The Dunmore Press. Palmerston North. 1996) 82 
13 
That the relevant Governor-General and not the Queen exercised the 
executive powers for Australia and New Zealand was made explicit in the 
Queen' s response to a request by the Speaker of the House that she intervene 
following Whitlam · s dismissal:33 
... the Australian Constitution firml y places the prerogative powers of the 
Crown in the hands of the Governor-General as the representative of the 
Queen in Australia. The only person competent to commission an Australian 
Prime Minister is the Governor-General , and the Queen has no part in the 
deci s ions which the Governor-General must take in accordance with the 
Constitution ... Her Majesty, as Queen of Australia, is watching events in 
Canberra with close interest and attention. but it would not be proper for her 
to intervene in person in matters which are so clearly placed within the 
jurisdiction of the Governor-General by the constitution. 
The Queen similarly refused to intervene in Fiji at the time of the military 
coups.34 Where the executive and prerogative powers of the constitution vest in 
the Governor-General, as they do in Australia and New Zealand, those powers 
are exercisable by the Governor-General and, as the Queen's actions have 
shown, will not be exercised by the monarch. 
C Judicial Powers 
The transfer of the ultimate court of appeal was achieved in each country 
by the passage of domestic legislation. In Australia, Section 11 of the Australia 
Act 1986 terminated appeals to the Privy Council. In New Zealand, the Supreme 
Court Act 2004 not only withdrew appeals to the Privy Council, but also 
established a superior court of final appeal in New Zealand. As of 2004, the final 
court of appeal in each country was situated in its own country and staffed by 
judges nominated by its own Attorney General. 
33 in LJM Cooray Conventions, the Australian Constitution and the Future (Legal Books. 
Sydney, 1979) 146 
34 Andrew P Stockley ·'Becoming a Republic : Matters of Symbolism'· in Trainor. above n32. 70 
14 
D Our Own (shared) Sovereign 
The evolution of the British monarch as the Queen in right of Australia 
and separately as the Queen in right of ew Zealand occurred at roughly the 
same time. The power of the Australian and New Zealand executives to advise 
the sovereign devolved from imperial declarations and legislation. The 1917 
Imperial Conference established that the powers vested in the Queen by the 
Australian and New Zealand constitutional instruments were exercisable by her 
on the advice of her Dominion. not British, Ministers.35 In 1927, British 
legislation was passed to affirm that the monarch related directly to the 
Dominion governments, not indirectly through the British government. 
Australian and New Zealand legislation provided that the Queen would be 
known as Queen of Australia and Queen of New Zealand, respectively, and 
removed from the Queen·s formal title references to the United Kingdom.36 As 
the High Court later held, the "allegiance which Australians owe to Her Majesty 
is owed not as British subjects but as subjects of the Queen of Australia" .37 
There was a similar evolution in the office of Governor-General being 
filled by Australians and New Zealanders rather than the British-born. In 1930, 
Australia' s Labour Prime Minister Scullin proposed Isaac Isaacs as Governor-
General , a choice criticised by JG Latham (later Chief Justice of the High Court 
of Australia) as showing a "lack of enthusiasm" for the British Empire.38 As a 
result of Scullin' s proposal and the King ' s demur, the 1930 Imperial Conference 
resolved the Dominion government should tender advice on the appointment of a 
Governor-General, after informal consultation with the King. Isaacs was duly 
appointed by George V. 39 Prime Minister Menzies reverted to recommending 
British aristocracy to become Governor-General until Australian Lord Casey was 
appointed in 1965. In New Zealand, New Zealand-born Sir Arthur Porritt was 
appointed Governor-General in 1967. Since Porritt had spent most of his 
35 
Saunders & Smith. above n25 , 5 
36 Royal Styles and Titles Act 1973 (Australia), Royal Titles Act 1974 (New Zealand) 
37 
Pochi v Macphee ( I 982) 151 CLR IOI Gibbs CJ (with whom Mason and Wilson JJ agreed) at 
109 
38 Sir Zelman Cowan ·'The Constitution and the Monarchy"' in Dutton, above n I. 49 
39 Cowan in Dutton, above n I, 49 ; See also Winterton, above n3, 20 
15 
working life in the United Kingdom, he was a 'transitional figure', to use Cox 
and Miller's phrase, who paved the way for New Zealand born and resident 
Dennis Blundell to be appointed Governor-General in 1972.40 The person who is 
the British monarch remains the head of state of Australia and ew Zealand but 
there has been an evolution in her separate roles as the Queen of Australia and 
the Queen of New Zealand, and in the appointment of Australians and New 
Zealanders to act as her vice-regal representatives. The Queen of Australia and 
of New Zealand might be the same person but. constitutionally, they are distinct 
entities whose roles are determined by separate constitutional instruments. 
E The Republican Debate 
In addition to the evolutionary transfer to Australia and New Zealand of 
the powers of the key constitutional actors, there have been numerous symbolic 
changes that highlight the increasing independence of Australia and ew 
Zealand from Britain. In ew Zealand, God Defend New Zealand was named 
the second national anthem in 1977, Maori became an official language in 1987 
and a New Zealand honours system was instituted in 1996.41 In Australia, 
Advance Australia Fair was proclaimed the national anthem in 198442, the basic 
qualification for membership of Parliament was changed from British to 
Australian citizenship,43 and an Australian honours system was instituted. 
The establishment of non-British national identities has not necessarily 
translated into a strong push for a republic. WC Wentworth commented in the 
1960s that: 44 
[t]here is virtually no republican sentiment in Australia. We do not wish to 
believe that our political leaders are the tops - they are more tolerable if we 
can maintain the feeling that somehow, somewhere. there is something 
above them. We assert our independence but we would rather not face its 
"° Cox & Miller "'Monarchy", above n 14, 52 
"
1 ''A Timeline of New Zealand's constitutional evolution to 2004" Appendix A Terms of 
Reference - Inquiry into the New Zealand Cons1itution :!005 
"
2 www.pm.gov.au/aus in focus/net svmbols/anthem.html (last viewed 3 September 05) 
u Sawer The Australian Constitlllion above n 16. 110 
.J.J in Don Whittington .. The Liberal Party and the Monarchy"' in Dutton. above n I. 149 
16 
ultimate consequences. It is not so much the abstract idea of an Australian 
President which is repugnant to us - rather it is the idea of an actual 
Australian as President. The Monarchy helps us to resolve this innate 
dilemma. 
This sentiment no doubt continues to resonate for many Australians. The 
complaint from some that New Zealand should not have its own court of last 
appeal because it could not guarantee sufficient quality of judges, suggests the 
sentiment also resonates in ew Zealand. 
Catalysts for recent Australian republican activity have been Whitlam's 
dismissal, the personal leadership of Prime Minister Paul Keating in promoting 
an Australian republic, and the marker of the year 2001 as the Centenary of 
Federation. In 1993 , the Republic Advisory Committee found that it was both 
legally and practically possible to achieve a viable federal republic of Australia.45 
The republican discourse reached its moment of truth on 6 November 1999, 
when a referendum to amend the Australian constitution was held - and defeated. 
There has been less prominent republican activity in New Zealand. New 
Zealand commentators have cast the shift to MMP as itself an assertion of 
independence from the Westminster system, claiming that the move from first 
past the post "end[ ed] the dependence on an inherited outlook. policies and 
institutional arrangements, and ma[ de] a move towards an indigenously crafted 
style of governance appropriate to a more mature New Zealand identity."46 In 
1994, Prime Minister Jim Bolger asked in Parliament whether New Zealand 
should "continue to have an appointed Governor-General as our Head of State, or 
should we move to an elected President? . . . [T]he big reason will be that we 
want to be independent New Zealanders" .. n Political colleagues and opponents 
distanced themselves from the calL some attributing it to Bolger's Irish ancestry. 
Perhaps the move to MMP was deemed sufficiently to reflect the changes in 
45 Republican Advisory Committee An Australian Republic: The Options - An Overview 
(Canberra, 1993) 
46 
Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine. Elizabeth McLeay, Nigel S Roberts New Zealand Under 
MMP - A New Politics? (Auckland University Press. Auckland, 1996) 2 See also Bruce lesson 
.. Republicanism in New Zealand" in Trainor, above 1132. 56 
47 (8 March 1994) 539 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) 121 
17 
political and social life in New Zealand, and so there was no perceived need to 
become a republic. 
There is probably a symbiotic relationship between the lack of an 
informed republican debate in ew Zealand and the lack of support for ew 
Zealand becoming a republic. A survey of opinion leaders conducted in 1995 
elicited that 44 per cent of people thought a New Zealand republic was likely in 
the next ten years.48 A poll conducted in March 2005 found that just under 50 
per cent of respondents opposed New Zealand becoming a republic, with 35 per 
cent in support. Asked whether ew Zealand would become a republic, 58 per 
cent thought yes, 29 per cent thought no and the remainder were unsure. One 
journalist thought it would be best to see what Australia would do before 
determining what sort of republic New Zealand should have.49 The republican 
debate in New Zealand is fledgling and republican scholarship is limited. 
While the journey towards robust republican debate has differed in 
Australia and New Zealand, the journey towards constitutional independence 
from Britain has been remarkably similar. Independence was achieved through 
imperial declarations, political decision-making, judicial interpretation and the 
passage of legislation. Australia and New Zealand have shared catalysts for 
major constitutional changes from the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 to the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 and the coincidental but parallel 1986 abolition of 
British legislative powers over Australia and New Zealand. This shared 
constitutional history and parallel constitutional evolution from colony to 
Dominion to independent nation state. highlights the value of a comparative 
study of republican options. 
-1s Boston, above 1146, 3 8 
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II OUR CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Despite our similar constitutional evolution, there are some distinctive 
constitutional features which will shape how a republic might be adopted in each 
country. The key differences are the existence of the Treaty of Waitangi and of 
MMP in ew Zealand, and of federalism and a bicameral Parliament in 
Australia. 
In New Zealand. the fact the Crown was a co-signatory of the Treaty of 
Waitangi has raised the spectre that the Crown must be retained in order to 
honour its Treaty obligations. Andrea Tunks argues the removal from New 
Zealand· s constitutional framework of a cosignatory would remove the personal 
relationship that carries the potential of justice and the enforcement of Treaty 
guarantees. 50 While there may be some emotional significance in the retention of 
the Crown, legally and politically the obligations have passed to the Queen in 
right of New Zealand. 51 As Prime Minister, Jim Bolger accepted that "the Treaty 
imposed obligations on New Zealand and New Zealand will have to honour these 
obligations irrespective of who or what we select or elect the head of state". 52 
But while the government might intend to honour its Treaty obligations, 
the different interpretations by Pakeha and Maori of the concept of tino 
rangatiratanga is likely to challenge how New Zealand can adopt a republican 
head of state as a constitutional sovereign. Moana Jackson asks "how can this 
country establish constitutional frameworks that recognise the equally legitimate 
sovereign rights of Maori and the Crown to exercise governance?"53 The idea of 
one sovereign, Jackson argues, is only possible by denying the possibility of any 
contending Maori constitutional reality. Mason Durie suggests the chance of 
New Zealand becoming a republic is quite high, with the colonial partnership 
having outlived any usefulness if might have had for Maori, but he too noted the 
50 Andrea Tunks ·'Mana Tiriti·' in Trainor. above n32, I 17 
51 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1994] I NZLR 513 Lord Woolfe at 517 
52 in Stockley ·'Becoming a Republic: Issues of Law" in Trainor, above n32, IOI 
'
3 Moana Jackson ··where does sovereignty lie?" in James, above n6 , 197 
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nervousness of the Crown about recogmsmg any sense of residual Maori 
sovereignty or right to self-determination. 54 
It is not clear how these questions about sovereignty, still rankling in the 
current system of constitutional monarchy, might be dealt with in a republican 
constitutional debate. Andrew Ladley thought that "how to constitutionalise the 
relationship between Maori and others" would in fact be a bigger constitutional 
hurdle for New Zealand than determining the powers of a head of state. 55 There 
are possible ways of acknowledging different forms of sovereignty authority, 
some fonns of which might be Maori. Durie, for example, proposed Maori 
participation in governance might be about the establishment of Maori governing 
bodies to control Maori resources and to interact with the Crown. 56 
Alternatively, there could be some form of devolution of authority as in 
Scotland.57 It is be worth considering whether constitutional sovereignty must be 
territorial. The Anglican Church in New Zealand has provided an example of 
parallel leadership through the creation of the Diocese of Aotearoa. Ensuring the 
sovereign rights and expectations of Maori as protected by the Treaty are 
included in any form of New Zealand republic might challenge a framework 
developed by Pakeha, but would be a vital step in New Zealand becoming a 
republic. Both Maori and Pakeha acknowledge that the very existence of the 
Treaty alters the republican discussion about the place of the sovereign in the 
constitutional framework. 
Another difference between the Australian and ew Zealand 
constitutional frameworks is apparent in our parliamentary systems, and their 
checks on executive excess. In New Zealand the main check to the 
unconstrained power of the executive is the MMP electoral system. 58 The 
prospect of coalition government foreshadowed by MMP seemed a desirable 
alternative to unrestrained executive power that had characterised previous 
54 Mason Durie Nga Kuhui Pou Launching Miiori Futures (Huia Publishers. Wellington. 2003) 
I 11-113 
55 Ladley in James, above n6, 275 
56 Durie, above n54. 140 
57 Durie. above n54. 169 
58 Boston, above n46. 19 
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decades. 59 MMP was seen as an important check on excesses of the executive. 
In Australia, the executive is constrained by the existence of the Senate and by 
the fact that executive power is more diffuse, with much of it resting with the 
states. While these constitutional differences change the nature of our politics, 
they act in much the same way in controlling the executive within the 
parliamentary system. But these features do not directly affect the relationship 
between the sovereign and the parliament or the sovereign and the electorate. 
The differences in our parliamentary systems do not of themselves alter the 
possibility or practicability of Australia and ew Zealand becoming republics. 
A more significant difference is the fact that Australia has an entrenched 
constitution. a major feature of which is that it gives power to the High Court to 
invalidate legislation as 'unconstitutional'. This judicial scrutiny was necessary 
in a federal system to referee disputes between the states and the commonwealth 
as to which had power to deal with certain aspects of government. The Court is 
therefore constitutionally able to constrain certain excesses of the executive. In 
ew Zealand, parliamentary sovereignty has been touted as a central feature of 
New Zealand's parliamentary democracy. 60 The supremacy of the Parliament 
and the intention of the executive to retain that supremacy would of itself weigh 
against any unconstrained presidential powers appearing in a New Zealand 
republic. 
Finally. it is worth noting the different ways the constitutional 
frameworks of Australia and New Zealand might be amended. Ironically, it 
would be easier for New Zealand, where there has been less republican 
momentum, to become a republic, simply by altering its non-entrenched 
constitutional legislation.61 Although legally the constitution might require only 
legislative change, political commentator Colin James has assessed that. 
politically, direct democracy has become more important in people's minds and 
thhefore no major constitutional changes could occur without a public 
59 Boston, above n46, 30 
60 See Dr Michael Cullen ·'Parliament Supremacy over Fundamental Norms" Address to the 
Public Law Conference. Legislative Council Chamber, 29 October 2004 
6 1 See Palmer & Palmer, above n2. 62 
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referendum. 62 In Australia, the entrenched constitution itself demands a 
referendum to amend the constitution. Moreover, to be successful, the 
referendum must be passed by a majority of voters in a majority of states.63 
These constitutional differences will affect the nature of the republican 
debate, most notably as to whether it could be limited to considering the role of 
the President or, as Lord Cooke has suggested for New Zealand, whether it 
would need to engage the whole republican agenda. 64 But it is reasonable to 
assume that given the evolutionary nature of constitutional change in Australia 
and ew Zealand, it is likely that the preferred republican model would be close 
in style to the current constitutional model. There is an argument that a move 
from a constitutional monarchy should open up greater opportunities for an 
executive president role such as in the United States or France, but it is more 
likely that a future republican head of state would inhabit an office very similar 
to that of the Governor-General. Having examined our shared constitutional 
evolution and identified key constitutional differences, this paper now turns to 
examine the office of the Governor-General in Australia and ew Zealand and 
the possible powers of a future President. 
III THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL 
In Australia and New Zealand. the constitutional instruments declare the 
Governor-General is the head of state, and constitute the office of the Governor-
General. 65 The Australian and New Zealand Governors-General are appointed 
by the sovereign on the advice of, respectively, the Australian and New Zealand 
Prime Ministers. The office of Governor-General is similarly constituted and the 
Governor-General has been granted similar executive powers in Australia and 
New Zealand. This part of the paper examines the current roles - symbolic, 
62 Colin James ·The Political History and Framework since 1980" in James. above n6. 166 
63 Australian Constitution. s 128 
64 Ladley ''Who Should be Head of State?" in James. above n6. 267 
65 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s2: Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-
General of New Zealand S/R 1983/225 (Letters Patent), Clause I: Australian Constitution. s2 
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ceremonial and constitutional - of the Australian and New Zealand Governors-
General. 
A A Symbolic Role 
ew Zealand Governors-General have emphasised the symbolic nature of 
their roles. Dame Cath Tizard saw it as a responsibility of the Governor-General 
to acknowledge a sense of community spirit and affirm those civic virtues that 
give ew Zealand a sense of identity and purpose. 
66 On another occasion she 
suggested the position existed in order to "proclaim - literally - the mana, the 
spirit and the ideals of our country" .67 Her successor, Sir Michael Hardie Boys, 
similarly highlighted the importance of the national symbolic. he used the term 
' community' role, calling the Governor-General ·'someone in whose office the 
diverse threads of national life can be brought together and expressed" .
68 Similar 
sentiments exist in Australia, where an advisory committee on constitutional 
reform found Australia needed a head of state because it brought the individual 
into relationship with the nation as a whole. The Committee recommended the 
maintenance of a head of state separate from the head of the government, 
precisely because of its importance as a symbol of national identity. 
69 
B A Ceremonial Role 
The Australian and New Zealand Governors-General also fulfill 
ceremonial roles - at the Opening of Parliament, in receiving the credentials of 
diplomatic representatives, in hosting visiting heads of state and in visiting other 
countries. 70 Stockley properly suggests that one virtue of the Governor-General 
rather than the head of government fulfilling these ceremonial roles is that it 
effectively deprives the Prime Minister of at least the symbols of ultimate 
. , 
66 Cox & Mill er " Monarchy" above n 14, 53 
67 in Andrew P Stockley ''Becoming a Republic : Issues of Law" in Trainor, above n32, 85 
68 Sir Michael Hardie Boys " 'Nodding Automaton?' Reflections of the Office ofGovernor-
General" (2002) 8 Canterbury LR 425 , 437 
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power,7 1 thus reinforcing through ceremony the fact that the executive 1s 
responsible to the Parliament. A republican President could continue to fulfil! 
these important ceremonial responsibilities. 
C A Constitutional Role 
The Australian and New Zealand Governors-General each exercise the 
executive powers of government, which stem from statute, the royal prerogative 
and reserve powers. In Australia, the executive powers are vested in the Queen 
and exercisable by the Governor-General. 72 The Governor-General exercises the 
powers and functions the Queen is pleased to assign to him. 73 It is now accepted 
that the Governor-General exercises all the powers previously exercisable by the 
Queen and that no further assignment of powers is necessary. In New Zealand, 
every power conferred on the Governor-General is a royal power exercised by 
the Governor-General on behalf of the sovereign. 74 The Governor-General is 
authorised and empowered to exercise the executive authority of ew Zealand. 75 
1 Powers Deriving fi·om Constitutional Instruments 
In New Zealand and Australia, the constitutional instruments designate 
powers exercisable by the Governor-General. The Governor-General can 
summons Parliament to meet76 and may prorogue or dissolve Parliament.77 
These powers are exclusively exercised by the Governor-General but other 
provisions of the constitutional instruments circumscribe their exercise. For 
example, Parliament must be summoned in each country within a certain period 
after the return of the writs following an election - six weeks in New Zealand
78 
and 30 days in Australia. 79 
7 1 Stockley "Becoming a Republic : Issues of Law'' above n32 , I 03 
72 Australian Constitution, s6 I 
73 Australian Constitution, s2 
74 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s3 
75 Letters Patent, C lause Ill 
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The Governor-General assents to bills passed by the Parliament, in order 
for them to become law. In Australia, the Governor-General declares he assents 
in the Queen's name. 80 A bill may be reserved for the Queen' s assent, although 
it must be assented to within two years. 81 The Australian Constitution even 
allows for the Queen to disallow a law once it has received the Governor-
General ' s assent. 82 This power has never been used. In New Zealand, either the 
sovereign or the Governor-General may assent to the bill. 83 
Each set of constitutional instruments provides that Parliament shall not 
pass a bill providing for appropriation of public money, unless the purpose of 
appropriation has been recommended to the House (in Australia, the House in 
which the proposal originated) by the Crown. 84 This power appears to be 
exercisable by the Governor-General but the recommendation to the House is in 
fact made on the advice of the government. The power's original purpose was to 
ensure the government had control over the spending process, by preventing 
Houses from passing spending laws without government approval. 85 
The Australian and New Zealand constitutional instruments provide that 
some powers are exercisable by the Governor-General in Council, that is, the 
Governor-General acting on the advice of the Executive Council.86 The 
Governor-General appoints members of the Executive Council87 and Ministers of 
the Crown88 including the Prime Minister, a role that is not explicitly defined in 
either constitutional framework. 
Specific powers designated by the Australian Constitution as exercisable 
by the Governor-General in Council include the power to cause writs to be issued 
80 Australian Constitution, s58 
81 Australian Constitution, s60 
82 Australian Constitution, s59 
83 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s 16 
84 Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s2 l; Australian Constitution, s56 
85 Cheryl Saunders The Australian Constitution -Annotated Text (Constitutional Centenary 
Foundation, Victoria. 1997) 63 
86 Australian Constitution ss62, 63; Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand) s3(2); Letters Patent, 
Clause VII 
87 Letters Patent, Clause X: Australian Constitution, s63 
88 Letters Patent, Clause X: Australian Constitution. s64 
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for general elections. 89 to issue a writ for a by-election if the Speaker is absent,90 
to establish departments of state of the Commonwealth and appoint officers,91 to 
appoint public service officers,92 and to appoint Justices of the High Court and 
other courts created by parliament.93 
The Australian Constitution also sets out a number of other roles for the 
Governor-General, often in a secondary capacity should the main constitutional 
actor in certain situations be unavailable. The Governor-General is the person to 
whom the Speaker and the President of the Senate may resign;94 to whom a 
Member of Parliament or Senator may resign in the absence of the Speaker or the 
President of the Senate respectively;95 to whom a Justice of the High Court may 
resign;96 before whom oaths of office can be taken by Senators and members of 
the House of Representatives;97 who can certify the names of Senators chosen for 
each state;98 and, if the President of the Senate is absent, who can notify the 
Governor of a State of a Senate vacancy.99 
The Australian Governor-General has some further distinct roles that 
result from specific features of the Australian constitutional frameworks. For 
example, the section that sets out the procedure for amending the constitution 
provides that if the House is deadlocked on a proposed law for altering the 
constitution, the Governor-General may submit the law to the electors of each 
State and Territory. 100 
The delineation of the powers of the Governor-General differs because of 
the more detailed Australian constitution. but the Australian and New Zealand 
Governor-General exercise similar statutory constitutional powers. 
89 Australian Constitution, s32 
90 Australian Constitution, s33 
9 1 Australian Constitution. s64 
92 Australian Constitution, s67 
93 Australian Constitution, ss72, 73 
94 Australian Constitution, ss35, 17 
95 Australian Constitution. ss37. 19 
96 Australian Constitution, sT2 
97 Australian Constitution, s42 
98 Australian Constitution. s7 
99 Australian Constitution. s2 I 
100 Australian Constitution. s 128 
2 Royal Prerogatives 
The royal prerogatives are similarly exercisable by the Governors-
General of Australia and of New Zealand. 101 It was settled early that the 
Dominion legislatures could validly legislate to restrict the powers of the 
Crown. 102 giving parliament control over the exercise of the prerogative and 
constraining any excesses of the executive. Most prerogative powers are now 
constrained by the "gradual march of statue law"' 03, to use Alfred Deakin's 
phrase. 
While some prerogative powers may appear to remam vested in the 
Governor-General. they are in fact exercisable by the Governor-General in 
Council. For example, Clause Xl of the Letters Patent authorises and empowers 
the Governor-General to exercise the prerogative of mercy but section 406 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 incorporates the prerogative power into statute in terms which 
make it clear it is in fact exercised by the Executive Council. 
104 Although in 
Australia and New Zealand the prerogative powers appear to be vested in the 
Governor-General, they are in fact exercised by the executive. 
3 The Reserve Powers 
The way in which executive powers are exercisable by the Governor-
General is curtailed by constitutional conventions. These conventions are 
"binding rules of political practice·''05 or "constitutional obligations" 106 that are 
understood by the Governor-General to govern the exercise of his or her powers. 
The purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that legal powers are 
IOI See for example Evatt, above n21 ; Alison Quentin-Baxter Review oflhe letters Patent /91 7 
Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand. issued by the Cabinet Office, June 
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exercised consistently with democratic principles, by stipulating how such 
powers should be exercised. 107 
The cardinal convention of both the Australian and New Zealand (and 
indeed British) constitutions "enjoins the Queen and the Governor-General to 
exercise their prerogative and statutory powers on Ministerial advice·'. 108 In a 
constitutional monarchy where the monarch reigns but parliament rules, the 
monarch 's personal discretion must of necessity be highly circumscribed. As 
Viscout Esher, adviser to the Edward VII and George V, said: 109 
If the Sovereign believes advice to him to be wrong, he may refuse to take 
it, and if his Minister yields, the Sovereign is justified. If the Minister 
persists .. . a constitutional Sovereign must give way. 
This convention effects responsible government.' 10 
While the convention 1s that the Governor-General ' s powers are 
exercised in accordance with Ministerial advice, in both Australia and New 
Zealand the Governor-General retains a personal discretion in relation to some of 
his or her powers. That is, in certain limited circumstances, the Governor-
General can exercise his or her power without Ministerial advice. This 
remaining discretion tends to be called the 'reserve powers '. Although these 
powers are exercised at the discretion of the Governor-General, they are ringed 
by conventions. These conventions are not universal and static. but are specific 
to each power and to each constitutional entity and have developed over time. 
There has been some suggestion in Australia that the Governor-General 
retains a personal discretion to protect the constitution. This argument is based 
on the fact that Section 61 states that the executive power exercisable by the 
Governor-General "extends to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution·'. This formulation of the executive powers provision in the 
107 John McGrath QC '·The Crown. the Parliament and the Government" 7 Waikato LR 1999. l. 3 
108 Joseph .. The Legal History and Framework of the Constitution" in James. above n6. 170 
109 in Winterton. above n3. 156 
110 Vic1oria v Commonwealth ( 1975) 134 CLR 81 Gibbs J at l 55-6 
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Australian Constitution differs from that in Clause III of New Zealand· s Letters 
Patent, which authorises the Governor-General to "exercise on our behalf the 
executive authority of Our Realm of New Zealand". The view that the 
Australian fornrnlation gave a personal discretion to the Governor-General was 
given some judicial credence by Dixon J in the Communist Party Case when he 
said ·'forms of government may need protection from dangers likely to arise from 
within the institutions to be protected·'. 111 
However, the subjective interpretation of such 'dangers' is itself a threat 
to the constitution. Constitutional expert de Forsey, for example, thought moves 
towards socialism constituted one such danger from which the constitution would 
d 
. II? nee protecting. - Sir John Kerr suggested he was exercising a power to 
maintain the integrity of the constitution in dismissing Whitlam. Defending 
Kerr's action, Sir Garfield Barwick, at the time of the dismissal Chief Justice of 
the High Court, argued that for Kerr to have allowed Whitlam to continue to 
govern without supply would have put Kerr in breach of his duty to maintain the 
constitution.' 13 The better view, persuasively argued by Winterton, is that it 
cannot be the function of the Crown to protect the constitution and there can be 
no independent vice-regal power to maintain the constitution. 114 
It has also been suggested that the Governor-General has some discretion 
as to whether or not to assent to legislation. 115 Viscount Esher's formulation 
above suggests this cannot be so, and former New Zealand Governor-General Sir 
Michael Hardie Boys more recently stated categorically that this should not be 
the case. 116 
Most commentators agree that the only extant reserve powers are the 
power to appoint the Prime Minister, the power to dismiss a Prime Minister, and 
the power to dissolve (including the power to refuse to dissolve) the House of 
111 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR I 
112 Stockley "Becoming a Republic: Issues of Law" in Trainor, above n32, 86 
11 3 Sir Garfield Barwick Sir John Did His Duty (Serendipity Publications, Wahroonga, 1983) 96 
114 Winterton, above n3, 28-3 7 
115 See Geoffrey Marshall Constitutional Conventions - The Rules and Forms of Political 
,,-1 ccountability (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1986) 22 
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Representatives. 117 In Australia, the Governor-General has a further power to 
dissolve both Houses of Parliament.' 18 This power mirrors that to dissolve the 
House of Representatives, so need not be separately considered in this analysis. 
(a) Appointment of Prime Minister 
In determining the appointment and dismissal of his or her Ministerial 
advisers, the Governor-General is by convention advised by the Prime Minister. 
The Governor-General appoints as Prime Minister the person with the confidence 
of the House of Representatives. As Professor Sawer has described the process 
for Australia, the political party machinery provides for the election of party 
leaders whose identity is notorious. The Governor-General then calls on the 
leader of the party with a majority in the House of Representatives to be Prime 
Minister. 119 Sawer·s emphasis on the leader of the party with a majority reflects 
the Australian political reality of a two party system, where the party with a 
majority of seats is usually also the party that commands the confidence of the 
House. In New Zealand, the convention is framed slightly differently. The 2001 
Cabinet Manual phrased the convention as requiring the Governor-General to 
appoint as Prime Minister the person who has or appears to have the support of a 
majority of members of the House, and concludes that "[t]he Governor-General 
will therefore accept the decision of the party or group of parties that has the 
support of the House as to which individual will lead the government as Prime 
Minister". 120 
This wording of the convention reflects the reality of MMP, under which 
the leader who is able to command the confidence of the House may not 
necessarily be the leader of the party with the majority of seats. Prior to the 
commencement of MMP. there was some suggestion that the Governor-
117 See for example Winterton. above n3. 17; Cooray, above n33, 44; Joseph, above n26; 
Electoral Commission Everything You Need to Know rlbout Voting Under MMP- New Zealand's 
Electoral System (GP Publications. Wellington. 1996) 81 
118 
For a discussion of the parameters surrounding the possible exercise of this power, see 
Professor Ryan The Power of the Governor-General to Dissolve the House of Representatives 
and Both Houses of Parliament (Australian Government Printer. Melbourne. 1980) 
119 Sawer, above n 16. I 
120 Cabinet Manual (200 l) para -l. I O in Palmer & Palmer. above n2. 59 
General's personal discretion would need to be exercised more frequently, given 
the likelihood of coalition and minority governments.
12 1 However, Sir Michael 
Hardie Boys, Governor-General at the time of the introduction of MMP, said it 
was clear that the responsibility for forming a government rested with the 
political parties: ·'It is political parties which, through negotiation, must find a 
viable government in the Parliament. No-one else can arrive at the solution for 
them or impose an outcome on them''. 122 While conceding that determining 
future political intentions from politicians ' public statements could be risky, 
123 he 
emphasised that: 124 
In a parliamentary democracy such as ours, the exercise of the powers of 
my office must always be governed by the question of where the support of 
the House lies. If that is unclear, I am dependent on the political parties 
represented in the House to clarify that support, through political discussion 
and accommodation. 
The Australian and New Zealand Governors-General have a power, 
exercisable without Ministerial advice, to appoint the Prime Minister. The 
reality in practice is that each Governor-General appoints as Prime Minister the 
person who commands the confidence of the House of Representatives. 
(b) Dismissal of Prime Minister 
The circumstances in which the Governor-General could exercise his or 
her reserve power to dismiss a Prime Minister are less settled. De Smith 
suggested, in relation to the United Kingdom, that if a government lost its 
majority in the House of Commons, yet insisted on remaining in office, the 
Queen would be justified in requesting the Prime Minister to advise a 
dissolution, and if the Prime Minister were to refuse, to dismiss him.
125 Dicey's 
proposition that it was right for the Crown to appeal from Parliament to the 
12 1 See for example Caroline Morris "The Governor-General, the Reserve Powers, Parliament and 
MMP: A new era" ( 1995) 25 VU WLR 345; Boston, above n46 , 37 
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electors when there was good reason to believe the House of Commons had 
ceased to represent it constituents, 126 also suggests support for a ready dismissal 
of a Prime Minister. 
In Australia, the exercise of this power by Governor-General Sir John 
Kerr was highly controversial. Kerr, believing the Senate would not pass the 
budget bill that had been referred to it by the House of Representatives. 
dismissed Gough Whitlam as Prime Minister and appointed the leader of the 
opposition party, Malcolm Fraser, as caretaker Prime Minister. Fraser informed 
the House of his commission as caretaker Prime Minister and the Senate passed 
the budget bill. Whitlam moved, and the House of Representatives carried, a 
vote of no-confidence in Fraser. The Speaker informed the Governor-General of 
the vote of no-confidence. The Governor-General took no action on the House 's 
Resolution. Fraser sought and was granted a double dissolution of the 
Parliament. 
Sir Garfield Barwick claimed the constitutional crisis arose because the 
Prime Minister refused to resign and seek a double dissolution. 127 He advised, 
and has since vigorously defended the position, that discretionary powers were 
exercisable by the Governor-General without the concurrence of the Executive 
Council. Other constitutional writers 128 have argued with more coherence that 
Kerr acted precipitately in dismissing Whitlam, given there was evidence the 
apparent constitutional deadlock would be resolved by the passage of the supply 
bill. 
The better view is that the power of a Governor-General to dismiss a 
Prime Minister must be limited to those circumstances where the constitutional 
infringement is clear and no judicial remedy is available. Professor Ryan has 
argued that if the orderly working of government established under the 
constitution could only be upheld by dismissing Ministers. the Governor-General 
126 in Ryan. above n 118. 4 
127 Barwick. above n I I 3, 5 
128 Cooray, above n3 3. 144: Winterton. above n3 
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could do so. 129 On this reasoning. New South Wales Governor Philip Game's 
dismissal of Premier Jack Lang for defying a federal proclamation might have 
been a case where dismissal was warranted. But as Professor Joseph has posited, 
any assessment of illegal behaviour is not one that should have been made by the 
Governor alone.
130 If the Governor could make that assessment, then the 
jurisdiction of the state and federal courts could effectively be substituted by the 
G ' 1 d" . 131 overnor s persona 1scret10n. 
Marshall was wisely more circwnspect than Ryan in concluding that 
Commonwealth precedents are consistent with the view that dismissal might 
properly be used as an act of last resort if a government were acting unlawfully 
in a way for which no conceivable legal remedy could be found.
132 Taking this 
approach, Premier Lang·s proclamation should have been reviewed by the High 
Court for inconsistency with a federal law, a legal remedy more consistent with 
democratic governance than Game's precipitate action. The constitutional 
criticism that followed the dismissals of Lang and Whitlam suggests the Marshall 
formulation most accurately reflects the current constitutional situation in 
Australia and New Zealand. 
( c) Dissolution of the House of Representatives 
The Governor-General also retains a reserve power to dissolve the House 
of Representatives. In 1923, Asquith asserted the King's discretion to refuse a 
dissolution to a Prime Minister defeated in a Parliament which could provide an 
alternative ministry.
133 King George V regarded himself as exercising an 
unfettered discretion in granting a dissolution to Ramsay Macdonald.
134 The 
reserve power in relation to requests for dissolution has been held to exist in the 
Dominions. In 1872, Lord Canterbury's refusal to act on the advice of the 
Premier of Victoria to dissolve the Victorian parliament demonstrated, according 
129 Ryan, above nl 18. 4 
130 Joseph, above n26, 685-6 
131 RQ Quentin-Baxter ·'The Governor-General's Constitutional Discretions: An Essay Towards a 
Redefinition" ( 1980) l O VUWLR 298 
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to Evatt, that the sovereign' s representatives in Australia retained the sovereign' s 
discretionary power. 135 More recently, former Australian Governor-General Sir 
Paul Hasluck thought it was the Governor-General's solemn responsibility to 
make a judgment about whether a dissolution was needed to serve the purpose of 
good government. 136 This last occurred in the United Kingdom in 1834. 137 
Despite Hasluck' s statement. it is no longer the case that the sovereign retains a 
discretion to dissolve parliament against the wishes of a Prime Minister with the 
confidence of the House. 
However, the reserve powers in relation to the dissolution of Parliament 
include the right to refuse to grant a dissolution when requested by the 
sovereign' s Ministerial advisers . The power to refuse to accept a Prime 
Minister' s advice to dissolve the House and instead seek an alternative 
government was exercised by Governor Byng in Canada in 1926. Prime Minster 
Mackenzie King lost a vote of confidence in the House and so sought its 
dissolution and an election. Governor Byng refused to dissolve the House, 
instead accepting King ' s resignation and commissioning the leader of the 
opposition as Prime Minister. However. the newly commissioned Prime 
Minister was unable to command a majority in the House and so in tum sought a 
dissolution, which was granted. This approach aligns with Churchill ' s view that 
"a new House of Commons has a right to live if it can and should not be 
destroyed until some fresh issue or situation has arisen to place before the 
I '8 electors" . ., 
Professor Ryan has argued that in Australia. the correct test to ascertain 
whether a Governor-General should exercise his or her reserve power to refuse a 
dissolution is that enunciated by Higgins CJ in 1914- that the Governor-General 
"must be personally satisfied, after independent consideration of the case, that 
the circumstances were such as to require a dissolution, and he must form his 
135 in Ryan. above n 120. 9 
136 Sir Paul Has luck The Office of Governor-General (Melbourne University Press. Melbourne. 
1979) 15 
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own judgment as to the existence of these circumstances''.
139 A condition of the 
exercise by the Governor-General of the power to refuse a request for dissolution 
then, would be that the Governor-General has reasonable grounds for believing 
an alternative government would carry on with the existing House. No 
Australian Governor-General has refused a request for dissolution. 
In New Zealand, it is generally accepted that if a Prime Minister retains 
majority support in the House, the Governor-General might question the need for 
a premature dissolution, but must grant it if the government persists in its 
advice. i-io There does not appear to be any proviso that the Governor-General 
must satisfy him or herself that no other party could command the confidence of 
the House. For example, in June 1984, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon 
requested a dissolution of parliament. on the basis that following the resignation 
of National MP Marilyn Waring he could not be sure of maintaining a majority 
in the House. The Governor-General granted the request; despite the fact the 
government's authority had not been tested in a vote of confidence in the 
House. 141 The Governor-General complied with the Prime Minister's request, 
without ascertaining whether another party had the confidence of the House. 
Although no discretion was exercised in 1984, Prime Minister Jim Bolger 
seems to have accepted that where it is not clear who has the confidence of the 
House, the Governor-General retains a discretion in relation to dissolution. 
Speaking at the time of the Selwyn bi-election, Bolger said:
142 
[S]ome believe that would enable me to ask the Governor-General for her 
consent to call a general election. l could ask, but that consent may or may 
not be given. She could judge it appropriate to cal l on the leader of the next 
largest party - Labour - to see whether she was able to form a government. 
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While, as Stockley argues, the Governor-General would be advised to grant a 
dissolution in cases where the government has lost majority support, 143 there 
does not in New Zealand seem to be any obligation on the Governor-General to 
consider whether an alternative government could command the majority of the 
House. 
Some of the literature dated immediately prior to the advent of MMP 
suggested that following the defeat of a Prime Minister in the House on a vote of 
no confidence, the leader of another party might be invited to try and form a 
government or Parliament might be dissolved and a general election held. 144 It 
seemed possible that a Governor-General might refuse a request for dissolution 
and instead ask another member to prove he or she had the confidence of the 
house. This suggested the Governor-General might have to determine whether 
there was a likelihood an alternative coalition of parties might command the 
confidence of the House. Commentators' fears were assuaged by Hardie Boys 
who, as with the appointment of a Prime Minister, made it clear the Governor-
General would be guided by political parties in determining whether another 
grouping could command the confidence of the House. In 2002, the Governor-
General had no hesitation in granting Prime Minister Clark a dissolution before 
the expiry of the term of the Parliament. 
Part III of this paper has shown how similar are the constitutional roles of 
the Australian and New Zealand Governors-General. In both countries, the 
office of Governor-General is constituted by constitutional instruments setting 
out a range of statutory powers. These powers are exercised by the Governor-
General on the advice of his or her Ministers, except in the very limited 
circumstances where the Governor-General retains a discretion to exercise power 
without advice. The Australian and New Zealand Governors-General retain a 
personal discretion, albeit ringed by constitutional conventions, in relation to the 
appointment of Prime Minister, the dismissal of a Prime Minister and the 
dissolution of the House. 
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IV POWERS FOR A PRESIDENT 
The 1987 Australian constitutional reform projects asked whether the 
constitutional powers of the Governor-General should be curtailed and the office 
left as purely ceremonial and symbolic. as in Sweden. It concluded that the 
constitutional role be maintained.
145 Given the similarities in the powers of the 
current Governors-General of Australia and ew Zealand. it is relevant to share 
ideas and options about the appropriate powers of a republican head of state. 
Although the nomenclature for a republican head of state has not been 
detennined - perhaps kaumatua or elder might be appropriate - the term 
'President' will be used , to distinguish the republican office from the current 
vice-regal one. 
A Statutory Powers 
On their face, the constitutional instruments appear to grant all executive 
power to the Governor-General, sometimes advised by the Executive Council. In 
practice, executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister and a group of 
senior Ministerial advisers that form the Cabinet, from which are chosen the 
members of the Executive Council. Firstly, then, the constitutional instruments 
should be amended to state that the President shall appoint an officer to head the 
government, to be known as the Prime Minister. 
146 The explicit mention of the 
office of Prime Minister would allow the Executive Council to be more clearly 
identified as a body that includes the Prime Minister and selected other 
Ministers. This would put these key constitutional actors into the parlance of 
political reality. Given that the Cabinet is an informal body subject to different 
permutations under different Prime Ministers, it should not be specifically 
identified in the constitutional instruments. Amending the constitutions to 
provide for the office of Prime Minister would lead to greater transparency of 
government and constitutional recognition that while the President might be head 
of state, the Prime Minister is the head of government. 
145 Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission, above n69 
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Secondly, vanous sections of the constitutional instruments could be 
amended to reflect the reality that executive power is exercised by the President 
on Ministerial advice. During the Australian Constitutional Conventions of the 
1890s, Sir Edmund Barton opined that the executive powers derived from the 
royal prerogative should, as a matter of constitutional form, be vested in the 
Governor-General, while those derived from statute should be vested in the 
Governor-General in Council. 147 Winterton argues that it was taken for granted 
that all powers vested in the Governor-General were subject to the principles of 
responsible government and would be exercised on Ministerial advice. 148 When 
the Australian constitution was drafted then, it recognised the difference in 
source of the sovereign's powers, rather than that those powers would be 
exercised in accordance with responsible government. But as Alison Quentin-
Baxter stated in her review of New Zealand's Letters Patent, the constitutional 
instruments should signpost that the Executive Council advises the head of 
state. 149 In order to avoid confusion and to limit expressly the powers of a 
President, the convention that certain powers are to be exercised by the President 
in Council should be made explicit. 
A 1987 Australian advisory committee on constitutional reform 
recommended amending Section 64 of the Australian Constitution to make it 
clear the President appoints and dismisses Ministers on the advice of the Prime 
Minister (except where the Prime Minister is also to be dismissed). 150 There is 
no reason why such a formulation would not also work in New Zealand. 
The power to assent to bills is another area where by convention the 
Governor-General acts on Ministerial advice. Given that for the bill to have 
passed the parliament it must invariably have been supported by the government. 
there is no valid reason for the power to assent to vest exclusively in the 
President. This power should be explicitly made exercisable by the President in 
Council. The power of the Queen to assent to bills or to disallow bills previously 
assented to, would by necessity become obsolete in the case of Australia 
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becoming a republic, since the Queen would no longer have any constitutional 
role with respect to Australia. Sections 59 and 60 could therefore be removed 
from the Australian Constitution. Other sections. including sections 5, 56, 57 
and 61 of the Australian Constitution should also be amended to provide 
explicitly that they are to be exercised only in accordance with Ministerial 
advice. 
Thirdly, the provisions in the Australian and New Zealand constitutional 
instruments providing that the Governor-General must send a message to the 
House authorising an appropriation bill 
151 should be removed. As the advisory 
committee found. such a requirement conflicts with parliamentary independence 
by making the parliament dependent on the executive for its funding, for 
example, of parliamentary committees. 
152 This largely symbolic change would 
clarify the actual role of the President, as separate from that of the Parliament. 
Fourthly, the role of Commander in Chief could be better defined. Sir 
Ninian Stephen considered in 1984 that "no question of any reserve power lurks 
within the terms of section 68 and practical considerations make it essential, even 
were constitutional ones not to require it, that the Governor-General should have 
no independent discretion conferred upon him by that section".
153 In reality, 
control and administration of the defence forces is exercised by the Ministers of 
Defence. The Advisory Committee recommended Section 68 could be amended 
to provide that the Governor-General's powers were purely ceremonial, and 
make it clear that the provision confers an office of titular head of the defence 
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force, not a power. ) Such an amendment would be equally applicable in the 
New Zealand context and would indeed be critical in limiting a President's 
powers in the event of Australia and New Zealand becoming republics. 
There are some duties currently exercised by the Australian Governor-
General that are of constitutional significance - for example accepting the 
15 1 Australian Constitution, s56 ; Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand), s2 I 
152 Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission. above n69 , 29 
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resignation of judges of the High Court - but do not allow much scope for the 
exercise of discretionary or, in extreme circumstances, arbitrary power. These 
duties could be transferred to a President without altering the balance of the 
constitutional framework. 
These proposed amendments to the constitutional instruments would give 
prominence to the role of the Prime Minister as a key constitutional actor and 
head of the government, make it abundantly clear that the powers of the 
President as head of state were exercisable on the advice of Ministers rather than 
independent! y. 
B Royal Prerogatives 
A republican government would no doubt wish to retain the flexibility 
and powers of the royal prerogatives, notably for example the prerogative to 
declare war and to conduct foreign affairs, while ensuring that such powers were 
not exercisable by an independent President. The royal prerogatives could be 
adapted into a republican system in several ways. 
An attempt could be made to define the prerogatives, in order that they 
vest in the republican executive. But their very complexity weighs against this 
option. Each thorough analysis of the royal prerogatives, from Chitty in 1820 155 
to Evatt in the 1920s 156 to Joseph in the 1990s 157 has identified them differently. 
Trying to define the prerogatives could only serve to limit their flexibility and 
adaptability. 
Alternatively, the prerogatives could remain unidentified, but the courts 
could review the manner of the exercise of the power. 158 In ew Zealand. the 
High Court has in fact held that the exercise of the prerogative power is subject 
to review by the Courts. In Patel v Chief Executive of the Department of 
155 Evatt. above n2 l. 29 
156 Evatt. above n2 l. J O 
157 Joseph. above n26. 595 
158 Winterton Parliament. The Execlllive and the Governor-General above nJ. I 37 
-+0 
Labour, 159 the Court held that the principles of the rule of law provided the 
norms for superintending the exercise of prerogative powers. 
But while making the powers subject to review by the comis would 
constrain their oppressive use by a President, there is no certainty that a 
republican constitution would be interpreted as transferring the exercise of the 
powers from the sovereign to the President. It would therefore be appropriate for 
the republican constitutional instruments to include a savings clause, preserving 
the prerogative powers. In Ireland, Article 49 of the constitution transferred the 
prerogatives from the British state to the Irish people.
160 Winterton has 
proposed. as a formulation for Australia, a provision to preserve "any power, 
function. right. privilege. immunity or prerogative derived from the royal 
prerogative.'' 161 It is submitted that such a formulation would also fit the New 
Zealand context. A savings provision would ensure that the prerogatives were 
transferred to the republic. Their exercise by the President could be limited by a 
formulation as in Ireland, transferring the powers to the people, or by explicitly 
noting that the powers were exercisable by the President in Council. An 
additional safeguard would be to make explicit that any exercise of the powers 
would be subject to judicial review. 
C Reserve Powers 
In Australia, the fact of Whitlam's dismissal shapes much of the thinking 
about the reserve powers. The possibility that a President would retain such 
powers and could exercise them in a similarly arbitrary manner supports the 
proposition that the powers of a President need to be restricted in some way. 
Anecdotally. it seems that New Zealanders do not hold the same fears of the 
exercise by the Governor-General of his or her personal discretion. Historically, 
this may be the case and politically, it seems unlikely. But constitutionally, as 
this paper has shown with respect to the head of state's powers, there is little 
159 
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difference between the Australian and ew Zealand situations. This section 
examines ways of controlling the reserve powers of a President. 
I Articulate the existence of the constitutional conventions 
Under the republican proposal put to the Australian people in the 1999 
referendum, the President, who was to be appointed by the Parliament, was to be 
given the same powers as currently held by the Governor-General. The Attorney 
General told Parliament: 162 
The President would have the powers, including the reserve powers, that the 
Governor-General has now. And the constitutional conventions that now 
apply to the exercise of the reserve powers by the Governor-General would 
apply to the exercise of those powers by the President. 
Under this model, the powers of the President were to be checked in two 
ways. Firstly, the Prime Minister could remove the President by no more formal 
means than a letter in writing. Such a method would grant the Prime Minister 
unchecked power to dismiss a President, removing even the current moral, if not 
legal, safeguard that the Prime Minister must consult with the Queen prior to 
removing the Governor-General. 163 In any event. the Australian public 
demanded an elected President who would not be able to be removed so easily. 
If the President were directly elected, leaving the reserve powers unchanged is 
not a viable option. 
Secondly, the reserve powers were to be "exercised in accordance with 
the constitutional conventions relating to the exercise of that power". 164 But as 
former Chief Justice of the High Court Sir Gerard Brennan has argued, importing 
the constitutional conventions into the constitutional instrument would require 
162 Hon Daryl Williams AM QC MP. Second Reading Speech of Constitution Alteration 
(Establishment of Republic) Bill 1999 (www.republic.org.au, last viewed 12 May 2005) 
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judicial review to be imported, to enforce observance of the conventions. And 
yet, judicial interpretation of the conventions would be fraught. Simply picking 
up the existing conventions would leave them frozen in time; ascertaining the 
content of the conventions at the time of the commencement of the republic 
would become more difficult over time; and the Court would inevitably be called 
upon to determine a political issue. 
165 In ew Zealand, a further difficulty would 
arise if the Chief Justice were acting as Administrator in the Presidenf s 
absence 166 at the time of the exercise of his or her reserve powers, putting the 
Chief Justice in a conflict situation. 
In order to avoid subjecting the court to making a political determination, 
the wording could specify that the constitutional conventions would not be 
justiciable. Professor Winterton proposed as wording for an Australian 
· · 167 prov1s10n: 
. . . the President shall exercise and perform his powers and functions in accordance 
with the constitutional conventions which are related to the exercise and performance 
of the powers and functions of the Governor-General , but nothing shall have the 
effect of converting constitutional conventions into rules of law. 
While this formulation might satisfy the proponents of the ' if it ain' t broke don' t 
fix it ' school of constitutional reform, it remains unsatisfactory if there were an 
elected President. It reinforces that the President has a personal discretion, which 
could lead to an alternative power base to Parliament. Furthermore, if the 
President had no constitutional knowledge or background, then this wording 
provides no clear idea of what the constitutional conventions constraining his or 
her powers might be. Simply stating in constitutional instruments that the 
President should act in accordance with undefined constitutional conventions 
would not either clarify or control the exercise of the reserve powers of an 
elected President. 
165 Brennan, above n 164, 51 
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Sir Gerard Brennan developed his own proposal: 168 
Permit the exercise of prescribed powers (of appointment and dismissal of a 
Prime Minister and dissolution of the House) without or contrary to 
ministerial advice only when the President is of the opinion on reasonable 
grounds that it is absolutely necessary to exercise such a power in order to 
ensure compliance with the general law of the effective working of 
parliamentary democracy in accordance with the law and custom of the 
Constitution. Then establish a Constitutional Council to certify that 
reasonable grounds exist for the President' s opinion. 
But there are difficulties with such a formulation, not least that it is wordy and 
confusing. Moreover, this would leave too much power with a President to 
interpret, albeit on reasonable grounds, how best to preserve democracy. This 
cannot be a task to be shouldered by a single person but should rather be the 
responsibility of all of the constitutional actors. 169 The political process and 
Parliament itself, rather than a President. should be the protectors of 
parliamentary democracy. 
2 Articulate the convention that the President acts on Ministerial advice 
A more subtle, and perhaps less effective, way of controlling the exercise 
of a President's powers would be to amend the constitutional instruments so that 
the concept of responsible government is explicitly expressed. In Canada, the 
British North America Act stated that government was to be in accordance with 
the principles of the government of the United Kingdom. This was determined to 
include the principle of responsible government. Such a derivative formulation 
referencing the governing arrangements of another country would be 
unacceptable in a republican constitution. But there are other ways to 
encapsulate the convention that the President exercises his or her power on 
Ministerial advice. 
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Australia· s 1998 Constitutional Convention suggested as the executive 
powers provision of a republican constitution: 
170 
The head of state shall exercise his or her powers and functions in 
accordance with the advice tendered to him or her by the Federal Executive 
Council. the Prime Minister or other such Ministers of State as are 
authorised to do so by the Prime Minister. 
While this would make explicit that the President is to act on Ministerial advice, 
it does not provide guidance as to the exercise of the reserve powers. Indeed the 
1998 Constitutional Convention· s 'direct election· model proposed that such a 
statement of the exercise of the executive powers should also be accompanied by 
partial codification of the conventions relating to the reserve powers. The 
amendment of the constitutional instruments to incorporate the idea of 
responsible government would be helpful, but insufficient on its own to control 
the exercise by the President of the reserve powers. 
3 Fully codify the constitutional conventions 
One way of clarifying the content of the reserve powers would be to 
codify the conventions surrounding their exercise, as has been done in the 
constitutions of Papua New Guinea. Malaysia and Jamaica. However, 
attempting to codify fully the constitutional conventions as they exist in Australia 
and New Zealand might well deprive the constitutions of the flexibility to 
d fu 1. · l · 171 respon to ture po 1t1ca cnses. Sir Robert Garran in 1897 in Australia 
expressed concerns that are still held about attempting to codify the conventions 
governing the exercise of the reserve powers: 
172 
To try to crystallise this fluid system into a hard and fast code of written law 
would spoil its chief merit; we must be careful to lay down only the essential 
principles of popular government, leaving the details of form as elastic as possible. 
170 George Williams "The 1998 Constitutional Convention - First Impressions" Current Issues 
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Codifying the conventions 111 the Australian and New Zealand 
constitutional instruments then, raises several difficulties. Firstly, constitutional 
experts have not been able to agree on how to reduce the constitutional 
conventions to words that would adequately and fully describe their content. As 
Professor Quentin-Baxter has so eloquently described, attempting to do so could 
result in the conventions suffering deformity in the course of transcription or 
losing their ambience when judicially interpreted. 173 Moreover. it is the 
interpretation of the political situation. rather than the actual content of the 
convention that is usually critical and, ultimately, controversial. As Alison 
Quentin-Baxter has argued. "no written provision conferring discretionary 
powers requiring the exercise of a political determination can provide for every 
imaginable contingency". 174 
Secondly, obtaining agreement as to how best to codify the conventions 
could well prove impossible. In 1981, Senator Gareth Evans introduced a 
Constitution Alteration (Fixed Term Parliaments) Bill that did even receive the 
required support in Parliament. Although fixed terms might have reduced the 
circumstances in which a President would be called upon to dissolve the 
Parliament, the idea was rejected as making the parliamentary system too rigid 
and unresponsive to the people. As a corollary, if the codified conventions were 
to appear in the Australian constitution, they might be frozen in time, given the 
difficulty and general unwillingness of the people to amend the constitution. 
In addition to these difficulties, codifying the conventions would, 
according to Barwick, make them justiciable. Barwick. like Brennan, argues that 
judges are ill-equipped to decide political questions 175 - a rather hollow claim in 
Barwick's case, given he advised Kerr in a 'personal capacity' that the 
circumstances were appropriate for him to exercise a reserve power. Winterton 
argues that as the reserve powers are implied from the constitution they are 
already justiciable. In a republican constitution therefore, the question of 
173 RQ Quentin-Baxter, above n 134. 305 ; See also Brennan. above n 164, 52 
174 Alison Quentin-Baxter. above 11 IOI. 250; Stockley ··Becoming a Republic: Issues of Law"' 
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whether the President has exceeded the ambit of his or her reserve powers should 
also be justiciable. However, Winterton does concede that a Court would be 
more prepared to review the validity of an action by a President without 
Ministerial advice if that action were taken pursuant to an executive power that 
lacked any element of reserve power. 
176 Although the courts in Australia have 
held they can review the exercise of Ministerial discretionary power, 
177 it is less 
likely that they would feel entitled to review Presidential discretionary power. 
Apart from codification in the constitutional instruments, another option 
might be to codify the conventions in legislation. The 1987 Australian 
constitutional reform advisory committee recommended the conventions be 
codified either by amendment to the constitution or in a law approved by 
parliament or as a statement of general guiding principles. 
178 However, while 
this might achieve the desired aim of clarifying the conventions, it would not 
succeed in constraining their use by a President. Codifying the conventions in 
legislation would be a less than transparent way of trying to circumscribe the 
constitution and, in any event, such a project would be beset by the same 
difficulties as faced by the codification in the constitutional instruments. Placing 
the conventions in some form of presidential guidelines, even with an express 
constitutional provision to exclude judicial review' 
79 would also be insufficient 
to limit the exercise of the reserve powers by an elected President. 
Alternatively, the circumstances m which a reserve power is to be 
exercised could be set out in a Parliamentary resolution. Following Whitlam's 
dismissal, the South Australian Parliament resolved that the Governor "should 
act on the advice of his Ministers and should not dismiss a Ministry" except if 
the Ministry was acting in breach of law or the Ministry lost the confidence of 
the lower house. 180 Such a formulation could place a President in the invidious 
position of considering the illegality of actions, a matter better left to the courts. 
In 1980, Professor Quentin-Baxter proposed that the ew Zealand House of 
176 Winterton, above n3 . 127 
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Representatives pass a Resolution containing an exposition of the constitutional 
conventions, as a guide for the Governor-General. 181 While such a resolution 
might guide a President, it would not be a legal restraint on the President 
exercising the powers according to his or her own discretion. 
-f. Partially codify the constitutional conventions 
The exercise of a President' s reserve powers might best be controlled by 
partial codification, which could avoid being too restrictive or rigid. Partial 
codification might be in the form of a single provision. Winterton proposed that 
the President be granted only such powers as are "absolutely necessary to 
preserve the rule of law and protect the operation of responsible government 
from abuse by the executive".182 For more effective control, such a provision 
should be accompanied by the codification of some specific conventions. 
The ' direct election' model of a republic designed by the 1998 Australian 
Constitutional Convention 183 proposed a partial codification that goes a long way 
towards addressing concerns that a President handed the current reserve powers 
would have too great an unrestrained discretion. The proposed codifications 
related to each of the reserve powers. The President would appoint as Prime 
Minister the person who commanded the support of the House through a 
resolution of the House and, in the absence of a resolution, the person who in his 
or her judgment would most likely command support. Such a formulation would 
still on the face of it allow substantial room for the exercise of presidential 
judgment. The power would be more properly constrained by adopting Hardie 
Boys ' view that the fo1mation of the government was solely a political matter, 184 
and so the clause phrase referring to the President's judgment should be 
excluded. The length of time following an election within which the House must 
be summoned could be shortened to ensure the House may sit and pass a 
resolution as to confidence closer to the date of the return of the writs. Provision 
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could also be made for the President to appoint as Prime Minister the next most 
senior Minister in Cabinet rank, should the Prime Minister resign or die in office. 
With respect to dismissal of a Prime Minister, the Constitutional 
Convention proposed that the President could dismiss a Prime Minister if he or 
she lost a motion of no-confidence and did not resign. Where the President 
perceived a constitutional contravention. the President could request a Prime 
Minister to demonstrate that no contravention was occurring, and if it was still 
occurring, the President could apply to the High Court for relief and dissolve the 
House of Representatives. While the first of these is a clear enunciation of a 
circumstance accepted in New Zealand as well as Australia
185 
as one in which 
dismissal would be appropriate, the second leaves too much discretionary power 
in the hands of an elected President. It is hard to envisage a situation where there 
might be constitutional contravention that would require the intervention of the 
superior court. The only historical example in Australia and New Zealand of 
' constitutional contravention' might be Lang's action in directing public servants 
not to abide by federal instructions. If such a matter were to re-occur, it should 
be a matter for other constitutional actors, or if the behaviour were criminal, law 
enforcement officers, to seek relief from the courts. An elected President should 
not retain such a sweeping personal discretion to subvert the democratic process 
by referring only to his judgment. 
As a corollary to the appointment power, the Constitutional Convention 
further proposed that the President not dissolve the House, if the House 
expressed confidence in another Member. This is a reasonably uncontentious 
articulation of the current constitutional convention. 
Partial codification of the sort outlined here would be valuable in shaping 
the President's powers. But the proposals recommend by the Constitutional 
Convention still leave power in the hands of the President in the event of a 
' constitutional crisis' the like of which has admittedly not occurred in either 
Australia or New Zealand. The partially codified conventions should be further 
185 RQ Quentin-Baxter, above n 134, 296; Joseph, above n26, 674 
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constrained to reflect the actual position as stated by Hardie Boys, that the 
primary responsibility for upholding the continuity of government rests with the 
political actors, not the head of state, 186 be it Governor-General or President. 
5 Establish a requirement to consult 
Professor Sawer has suggested that experience in law or politics would 
qualify people for the constitutional duties of office. 187 Indeed. he "fervently 
hoped" 188 that future Governors-General would always have experience of the 
working of government. But a precondition that an elected President have such 
powers would make the office less than representative, and severely limit the 
legitimacy of the President ' s symbolic and ceremonial roles. In order to make 
the office more accessible, it would be appropriate to ensure a reservoir of 
constitutional knowledge to be drawn on by the President, which could also act 
as a check on the exercise of a personal discretion. 
In New Zealand, the Governor-General may refer to the Solicitor-General 
for advice, but Boston and others have suggested that even so, there would be 
value in formalising the process by which a President could source expert advice 
about his or her role. 189 No such facility is available in Australia, where it is not 
clear to whom the Governor-General could tum for advice as to the exercise of 
his or her constitutional role. A President should be provided with some 
resources to enable him or her to exercise his or her powers constitutionally. For 
example, the superior court in each country could be given the jurisdiction to 
prepare advisory opinions as to whether the constitutional stipulations for 
exercising the reserve powers, for example the power to dissolve Parliament, 
have been satisfied. 190 In New Zealand, if the current practice of appointing the 
Chief Justice as Administrator were maintained in a republican constitution, the 
Chief Justice would obviously have to recuse him or herself from considering 
186 Hardie Boys ·'Role of the Governor-General under MMP" above nl 16 
187 Sawer, above n 16. 46 
188 Geoffrey Sawer A Paper on Conventions governing the appointment and dismissal of 
Ministers of the Crown in the Constitutional System of the Commonwealth of ,,.l ustralia 
(Government Printer. Melbourne) 22 
189 Boston. above n46, 183 
190 Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission. above n69. ~4 
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any action undertaken while he or she was acting as Administrator 111 the 
President's absence. 
Alternatively, an amendment to the constitution could establish a 
Constitutional Cow1eil to be consulted by the President prior to the exercise of 
the reserve powers. Father Frank Brennan proposed a 'Council of Elders ', 
because he saw it as unthinkable for a President to enjoy "undefined reserve 
powers without recourse to a formally approved set of advisers".
191 Possible 
members of such a council could be members of the bench of the highest courts 
(Supreme Court in New Zealand and High Court in Australia), State Governors 
in Australia and the immediate past Govemor-General.
192 Such a body would be 
a valuable addition to the constitutional framework. 
6 Sanction the President 
An extreme sanction that would be that the President would forfeit his or 
her position and not be allowed again to occupy the office if he or she exercised a 
reserve power according to personal discretion rather than on the advice of 
Ministers. As Winterton noted "[t]his would certainly be one way to reduce any 
perceived danger of presidential exuberance in the exercise of reserve 
powers". 193 This sanction has the advantage of being an effective restraint on the 
use of the reserve powers, but the disadvantage that an elected President would 
be very unlikely ever to forfeit his or her position, even if the executive was 
acting dictatorially and against the wishes of the people and the Parliament. For 
example, one rare circumstance where it would be appropriate for the President 
to exercise a personal discretion to dismiss the Prime Minister, would be if the 
Prime Minister refused to resign after a no-confidence vote and purported still to 
hold the Treasury benches. A President might be reluctant to exercise a personal 
discretion in such a case, if he or she were to lose his or her own job by doing so. 
But this disadvantage is minor. As Professor Quentin-Baxter showed in his 
analysis of the reserve powers in New Zealand, the annals of the old 
19 1 in Coper & Williams, above n l 71 , 39 
192 Winterton ·'A Directly Elected President" above n4. 43 
193 George Winterton "The President: Adapting to Popular Election in M Coper & G Williams 
(eds) Power, Parliament and the People (Sydney, 1997) I, 40 
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Commonwealth do not disclose any cases in which government set out to subvert 
the constitution and had to be stopped. They disclose a few cases in which a 
power of dismissal was exercised in less than extreme situations because of 
mistrust and miscalculation, compounded by a gap in the relevant rules. 194 
Another sanction would be to create an impeachment mechanism. under 
which the President could be 'tried' by the Houses of Parliament. A President 
might be impeached for stated misbehaviour or criminal conduct. 195 The 
disadvantages are that determining what constitutes stated misbehaviour would 
be subjective and indeed any exercise of a personal discretion that went against a 
particular political party might be deemed to satisfy this standard. While it 
seems unlikely, given the more reserved political culture in Australia and ew 
Zealand, there is no guarantee that such a process would not be highly politicised 
and reach the levels of hysteria as in the attempted impeachment of President 
Clinton in the United States. In addition, the process would be cumbersome and 
time consuming. The fact that the attempt to impeach President Clinton failed 
also suggests that such a process would provide insufficient restraint on a 
President' s behaviour. If a President were deemed guilty of criminal activity, he 
or she should be subject to criminal jurisdiction of the courts rather than an 
impeachment process. 
7 Relocate the current reserve powers to the House of Representatives 
It is productive to consider whether other constitutional bodies might 
better perform some powers currently held by the head of state. The partial 
codification of powers begins this process by making it clear that the support of 
the House is critical in appointing a Prime Minister. Boston and others suggested 
that the Speaker could be allowed to appoint a Prime Minister, 196 although it 
seems illogical to assume the election of a Speaker prior to the expression of the 
confidence of the House in a member as Prime Minister. The Irish model 
provides an interesting precedent. The Irish president appoints a Prime Minister 
194 RQ Quentin-Baxter. above n 134. 3 I 3 
195 See for example Sharman ·'The Pink Slip - Removing the President" above n l 63. 89 196 Boston. above n46. 183 
on the nomination of the Dail (Parliament). As Hardie Boys notes, the President 
is thus distanced from political negotiation and receives public and unequivocal 
advice on its conclusion. The advice on whom to appoint is channelled through 
the Parliament. 197 At present there is in Australia or New Zealand no 
requirement for Parliament' s explicit endorsement of an incwnbent government 
after an election. A government might continue until it loses a vote of no 
confidence. It would be possible to impose a requirement for a positive 
confidence motion by the House. 
Stockley has suggested wording for New Zealand very similar to the 
wording proposed by the Australian Constitutional Convention' s 'direct election' 
model of partial codification of the convention for appointing a Prime 
Minister: 198 
.. . wherever it is necessary for the Head of State to appoint a Prime Minister, the 
Head of State shall appoint that person who commands the support of the House of 
Representatives expressed through a resolution of the House. 
There would need to be some tinkering with other constitutional requirements, 
including the swnmoning of the House sooner after the return of the Writs, and 
greater clarification in the Cabinet Manual of the caretaker procedures to avoid 
an interregnum. 
The power to dismiss a Prime Minister might also be relocated to the 
House, by requiring that no-confidence motions be limited to constructive 
motions. That is, that a motion of no-confidence would be accompanied by a 
resolution to dissolve the House, with that dissolution to become automatic. 199 
The disadvantages are that such a requirement might be a recipe for political 
gridlock,200 and might require more numerous elections since the proposal 
removes the potential for a new government to be formed from the same House. 
197 Hardie Boys ·'Continuity and Change" above n 122, 6 
198 Stockley .. Becoming a Republic : Issues of Law" in Trainor, above n32 , I 07 
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If Australia and New Zealand decide to retain a constitutional role for 
their republican Presidents, then the President's role must be carefully defined 
and the President' s powers must be limited, in order to ensure the office does not 
become either an undemocratic check on the elected Parliament or a competing 
power base that threatens Parliament's role. This part of the paper has outlined 
how the statutory powers of the Australian and New Zealand Governor-General 
might be transformed into statutory powers of the President through clarification 
of the role of the Prime Minister and of the constitutional convention that a 
President is to act on Ministerial advice. 
The possible exceptions to a stated requirement to act on Ministerial 
advice might occur in relation to the exercise of the reserve powers to appoint a 
Prime Minister, dismiss a Prime Minister and dissolve the House. The better 
approach would be to accept Hardie Boys' conclusion that these aspects of 
government are political matters for politicians to resolve. However, the fact of 
Whitlam ' s dismissal suggests that firmer controls on the President's power 
would be expected and therefore required to remove doubt about the extent of a 
President's powers. 
It would be appropriate to circumscribe the exercise of the discretionary 
reserve powers by firstly. clarifying the circumstances in which they might be 
exercised and secondly, curtailing the likelihood of the President reaching for the 
reserve powers instead of acting on Ministerial advice. The constitutional 
conventions surrounding the exercise of the reserve powers should be partially 
codified, for example to acknowledge constitutionally that the leader who can 
command the confidence of the House must be appointed Prime Minister. There 
is even a persuasive argument that the responsibility of determining who should 
be Prime Minister lies with the House, who in turn should so advise the 
President. The partial codification of the constitutional conventions should be 
accompanied by the provision of constitutional advice to the President by way of 
a Constitutional Council, and perhaps also by the sanction of the President in the 
form of the office of President being vacated in the event of the use of the reserve 
powers. Only if the circumstances in which the reserve powers might be used 
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are clearly delimited and the exercise of the reserve powers constitutionally 
discouraged. should a republican President retain a constitutional role. 
V CONCLUSION 
Australia and New Zealand have become modem constitutional 
monarchies through a process of legislation, declaration and political decision-
making. The final momentous step for each to become a republic and attain final 
symbolic as well as political independence from the United Kingdom, will be the 
replacement of the sovereign as head of state. This paper has shown how the 
similarities of Australian and New Zealand constitutional arrangements, together 
with our similar expectations of democratic governance by Parliament, mean that 
the options for a republican head of state proposed in one country are worth 
considering in the other. 
Firstly, it examined the shared evolution of our constitutional 
arrangements and the gradual and, in large part parallel, acquisition of 
constitutional independence. Secondly, it recognised that each country retains 
distinctive constitutional characteristics, which will affect the possibility and ease 
with which each might become a republic. Thirdly, it analysed the symbolic. 
ceremonial and constitutional roles of our current Governors-General, an analysis 
which served to highlight their similarity. Fourthly, it responded to the challenge 
of considering ways of limiting the powers, with particular focus on the reserve 
powers, of a directly elected President in order to preserve the constitutional 
balance. After assessing the options, Part IV concluded that the current role of 
the Governor-General could best be preserved for a republican President through 
the partial codification of the constitutional conventions surrounding the exercise 
of the reserve powers and by the formation of an independent Constitutional 
Council to advise the President. 
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In each country, the republican debate will need to be dramatically 
reinvigorated before there is any likelihood of a referendum being put to the 
people and then gaining the required support. Proponents of a republic should 
take advantage of the hiatus in republican momentum to hone and polish a 
constitutional model that would also protect our modem democracies by 
constraining the powers of a President and so retaining the constitutional balance 
that has served our countries well. 
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